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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN CURRIER, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden, 
Respondent-Appellee. 
Case No. 920467-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-
3(2)(g)(Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. IS THE THREE MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-12-31.1 (1992) A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL LIMITATION? 
II. DID THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY DISMISS THE PETITION BASED ON 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OF SECTION 78-
12-31.1? 
STANDARD OF APPFT.T.ATE PEVTRW 
In considering an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, no deference is accorded the lower court's 
conclusions of law that underlie the dismissal of the petition. 
1 
Rather, the Court reviews such determinations for correctness. 
Termunde v. Cook, 786 P. 2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez 
v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 3, 1988, petitioner pleaded guilty to sexual abuse 
of a child, a second degree felony. See Case No. 2434, Seventh 
District Court, On April 3, 1989, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
sentenced petitioner to eighteen months probation. The court 
further sentenced him to serve six months in the Carbon County Jail 
as a condition of his probation. Id.. Petitioner's two attempts to 
withdraw his guilty plea were unsuccessful. (R. 61-62). 
Pe*- - tioner filed an appeal which he ultimately abandoned, against 
the advice of his counsel. (JEd.. ) . Petitioner's codefendant in the 
underlying criminal matter executed an affidavit on October 21 
19 91 in which he recanted his damning testimony against petitioner. 
Br. of App. at 7-8. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus on April 16, 1992, some six months later, claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the plea 
agreement and sentencing. (R. 2). Br. of App. at 6. The State 
filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations 
References to the "State" are to the respondent warden. 
2 
contained in Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-31.1 (1992). The trial 
court granted the State's motion to dismiss on June 12, 1992, and 
the final order was entered on June 22, 1992. (R. 88-90). 
This Court denied summary disposition on August 31, 1992. 
Thereafter, petitioner filed his brief, claiming that: 1) the 
district court improperly dismissed his petition pursuant to the 
three-month statute of limitations; and 2) the statute of 
limitations is unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of facts beyond those set forth in the above 
Statement of the Case is not necessary to resolve the issues 
presented on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The three-month statute of limitations contained in Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-12-31.1 (1992) is a constitutionally permissible 
procedural limitation under the Utah Constitution. This section 
does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but merely procedurally 
limits the time period when a petition may be filed. The writ 
remains available to any person who acts diligently and files a 
claim within the specified time-frame. 
Moreover, section 78-12-31.1 does not violate Article VIII, 
section 4 of the Utah Constitution. That provision grants the Utah 
Supreme Court the authority to establish procedural court rules. 
Section 78-12-31.1 is not a rule of procedure, but a statute that 
procedurally limits the filing of habeas petitions. Therefore, 
3 
section 78-12-31.1 is not governed by Article VIII, section 4. 
Additionally, Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
grants the Utah Legislature the power to create the laws governing 
the State of Utah. Therefore, section 78-12-31.1 is a 
constitutional legislative enactment, pursuant to Article VI, 
section 1. 
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, section 78-12-31.1 allows 
for excusable delay, since it is a procedural bar only as to 
grounds a petitioner should have been aware of through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence. The mere fact that petitioner's claims 
did not fall under this condition does not mean that excusable 
delay is not an available exemption. 
Furthermore, section 78-12-31.1 is a reasonable time-period as 
applied to petitioner's case. Petitioner's claims were known or 
should have been known to him, through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, within 90 days of his sentencing. Therefore, section 
78-12-31.1 did not unreasonably limit petitioner's ability to file 
a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the district court properly 
dismissed petitioner's petition pursuant to section 78-12-31.1, 
since petitioner filed his petition more than 36 months after his 
sentencing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE THREE-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-31.1 
(1992) IS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL 
LIMITATION. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-31.1 (1992) is a constitutionally 
permissible procedural limitation under the Utah Constitution.2 
Section 78-12-31.1 provides that an action for habeas corpus relief 
must be commenced within three months from the time the grounds are 
known to petitioner, or "in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been known to petitioner or counsel for petitioner." 
Petitioner claims that the statute is an unreasonable, non-
procedural enactment which violates the Utah Constitution. 
However, mere allegations that a statute is unconstitutional will 
not meet the requisite burden necessary to invalidate it. 
"[Legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of 
validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is 
no reasonable basis upon which they can be construed as conforming 
to constitutional requirements." City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). "[W]hen an act of the 
Legislature is attacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the 
question presented is not whether it is possible to condemn the 
act, but whether it is possible to uphold it." Lehi City v. 
2Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever ruled 
on the constitutionality of section 78-12-31.1 in a majority 
opinion. However, the issue is currently pending before the Utah 
Supreme Court (McClellan v. Holden, Case No. 920249), and it was 
briefly discussed in the concurring and dissenting opinions of 
Justice Zimmerman and Justice Stewart in Smith v. Cook, 803 P. 2d 
788, 796-797 (Utah 1990) . 
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Meilinq, 48 P. 530f 535 (Utah 1935). Considering the presumptions 
of statutory validity, petitioner has not established that section 
73-12-31.1 violates the Utah Constitution. 
A. Section 78-12-31.1 Is A Constitu-
tional Procedural Limitation Which 
Does Not Suspend The Right To 
Petition The Court For Habeas Corpus 
Relief. 
Petitioner claims that section 78-12-31.1 is not a procedural 
limitation, implying that section 78-12-31.1 suspends the right to 
petition the court for habeas relief. Article I, Section 5 of the 
Utah Constitution states: "The privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or 
invasion, the public safety requires it." The question is whether 
the 90-day limitation period attached to habeas corpus proceedings 
amounts to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the procedural limitation 
period does not suspend the writ. Considering this very issue, 
several states have found that statutes of limitation on filing 
habeas corpus petitions do not "suspend" the constitutional right 
to petition for habeas corpus relief. See Bartz v. State of 
Oregon, 825 P.2d 657 (Or. App. 1992); Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 
707 (Iowa 1989). Such statutes are viewed as mere procedural 
limitations which do not unconstitutionally suspend the writ. 
In Bartz, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal 
of a habeas petition on the ground that the petition was not timely 
filed. The court held that Oregon's 120-day statute of limitations 
on habeas corpus petitions did not violate Article 1, Section 23 of 
6 
the Oregon Constitution, which is almost identical to Article I, 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, prohibiting suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus. The Oregon court concluded that the statute 
of limitations imposed only procedural conditions on a claim for 
post-conviction relief, and did not dilute the substance of the 
writ. Therefore, the statute of limitations did not impermissibly 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Bartz, 825 P.2d at 660. 
In another similar case, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that 
its statute of limitations governing habeas corpus actions was 
constitutional under the Iowa Constitution. Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 
709. While the constitutions of Iowa and Utah are not identical, 
they both prohibit suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The 
Iowa Supreme Court first recognized that the state legislature had 
authority to place reasonable time restrictions on the filing of 
civil actions, and that such limitations on the right to seek a 
writ of habeas corpus are constitutional under both the United 
States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 
709-710. The court concluded that the statute of limitations did 
not unconstitutionally suspend the right to habeas corpus relief 
under the Iowa Constitution. 
This Court should follow the analysis of the Iowa and the 
Oregon courts and conclude that the statute of limitations is not 
a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, but merely a procedural 
limitation on when the right may be asserted. Attaching a 
limitation period on the time for filing a habeas petition does not 
unconstitutionally suspend the writ. The writ remains available to 
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any person who acts with diligenc and files a claim within the 
time period specified by law. Adccionally, the right to petition 
is tolled indefinitely until the violation giving rise to a claim 
becomes known or in the "exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been known." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1. Thus, the 
provision does not bar anyone from actually filing a petition with 
the courts, but merely creates a procedural bar if the petition is 
not timely filed. 
B. Section 78-12-31.1 Does Not Violate 
Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Petitioner claims that if section 78-12-31.1 is a procedural 
limitation, it violates Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. Article VIII, Section 4 delineates the rule-making 
power of the Utah Supreme Court, stating in pertinent part, 
"[t]he Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to 
be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the 
appellate process." Utah Const, art. VIII, § 4. Petitioner claims 
that Article VIII, Section 4 grants m e Utah Supreme Court the sole 
power to create all procedural limitations. Therefore, petitioner-
argues, if section 78-12-31.1 is deemed procedural, it is 
unconstitutional because it was not created by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Br. of App. at 13. 
Petitioner's argument is unfounded. A close reading of 
Article VIII, Section 4 reveals that it grants the supreme court 
only the power to adopt Court rules of procedure (e.g., Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules of Evidence, Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
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However, section 78-12-31.1 is not a rule of procedure, but rather 
a statutory provision which is procedural in nature. Since section 
78-12-31.1 is a statute of limitation, rather than a rule, it does 
not fall within the boundaries of Article VIII, Section 4. 
Furthermore, Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
grants the Utah Legislature the power to create the laws of the 
state of Utah. Utah Const, art. VI, § 1. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that the legislature has every law-making power that is 
not expressly or impliedly withheld by federal or state 
constitution. See State ex rel. Stain v. Christensen, 35 P.2d 775 
(Utah 1934). See also Lehi City v. Meilinq, 48 P. 2d 530 (Utah 
1935). Petitioner fails to cite a constitutional provision 
reserving to another branch of government the power to create 
statutes of limitation, and the State is unaware of any such 
provision. Therefore, petitioner's claim lacks merit. 
C. Section 78-12-31.1 Contains A 
Provision For Excusable Delay. 
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, section 78-12-31.1 allows 
for excusable delay, since it is a procedural bar only as to 
grounds a petitioner should have been aware of "through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1. 
Therefore, a petition raising issues that could not have reasonably 
been discovered within 90 days will not be procedurally barred. 
Whether a claim could have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence depends on the facts of each case, but the 
foregoing demonstrates that section 78-12-31.1 allows for excusable 
delay. Therefore, petitioner's claim is unfounded. 
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D. The Statute Of Limitations For 
Habeas Corpus Actions Is A 
Reasonable Procedural Limitation 
Under The Facts Of This Case. 
In order to be constitutional, "a statute of limitation must 
allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a cause 
of action arises." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P. 2d 670, 
672 (Utah 1985). What constitutes a reasonable amount of time to 
bring a given cause of action depends upon various factors, 
including the nature of the action, the interests of government and 
the interests of the litigant. Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 710. The mere 
fact that the limitation period found in section 78-12-31.1 is 
relatively short does not in itself create a presumption of 
unreasonableness. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals has held that Oregon's 120-day 
limitation period for bringing habeas corpus actions is reasonable. 
Bartz v. State of Oregon, 825 P.2d 657 (Or. App. 1992). The 
Arizona Court of Appeals has held that a 30-day limitation period 
for an action by a lessor of motor vehicles to recover license tax 
was not unreasonable. Shaw v. State, 447 P. 2d 262 (Ariz. App. 
1968). The limitation period cannot be evaluated under a generic 
standard, but must be reviewed in light of the circumstances of the 
case and the nature of the proceedings. 
In determining the reasonableness of a specific statute of 
limitations, the Court must first consider the purpose for which 
the statute was created. A core purpose for the limitation found 
in section 78-12-31.1, as with all limitation periods, is to compel 
the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so as to 
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avoid stale claims where evidence no longer exists and memories 
have faded. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P. 2d at 1098 (Utah 
1989) . 
Under section 78-12-31.1, individuals who claim unlawful 
restraint of their liberty must file a habeas action within 90 days 
of discovery of the claim or the time the claim should have been 
discovered. The relatively short limitation period requires prompt 
action to have the legality of restraint adjudicated. This permits 
the courts to review habeas petitions while relevant evidence is 
still fresh and records are available. It further promotes the 
finality of the judgment leading up to the restraint. Habeas 
corpus petitions brought in a timely manner conserve state 
resources and prevent lawfully incarcerated inmates from 
intentionally waiting years to file actions and then benefitting 
from fading memories and forgotten or unobtainable witnesses. This 
was the very reason the Utah Legislature enacted section 78-12-
31.1. See Tr. of Senate Debate on S.B. 245 (Addendum A); Tr. 
House Debate on S.B. 245 (Addendum B). The enactment was further 
intended to curtail prison inmates from filing belated suits 
against the State, resulting in increased litigation expenses, 
burdens, and delays that otherwise would not be present. Id. 
When an inmate files a habeas petition challenging a 
conviction or sentence long after its occurrence, as in 
petitioner's case, it can often result in an effective acquittal of 
the underlying criminal conviction where one is not justified. 
When a conviction or sentence is invalidated by a court in a habeas 
11 
proceeding, the matter usually returns to the trial court for 
correction of underlying error. This may require a new trial. 
However, when a long period of time has elapsed since conviction 
and sentence, witnesses and evidence may be unavailable, rendering 
the State unable to re-prosecute the case. Thus, the result is the 
equivalent of an unjustified acquittal. 
Section 78-12-31.1 also assures the State and the courts that 
they can rely on the finality of their actions after a three month 
period has elapsed. Finality of judgment is not only important to 
the State and agencies subject to habeas corpus review, but it is 
vitally important to the victims and witnesses of criminal behavior 
who desire to put the incident behind them and continue their 
lives. See Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968) 
Another factor to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the 90-day limitation period, is the burden 
placed on a petitioner by the limitation. Habeas corpus 
proceedings are unique from other civil actions in that they 
uniformly arise out of administrative and judicial proceedings 
where the actions giving rise to the claim for relief are readily 
ascertainable. The overwhelming majority of habeas corpus 
petitions challenge decisions made and actions taken at trial and 
sentencing, Board of Pardons' hearings, and prison disciplinary 
proceedings. Long periods of time are not necessary to formulate 
the ground(s) for habeas corpus relief. The very nature of the 
proceedings from which relief is sought makes the claim(s) 
available immediately. In this sense, a habeas action is similar 
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to an appeal from a criminal conviction, where the notice of appeal 
must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment of 
conviction. Any errors at trial that provide a basis for appeal 
are presumed readily ascertainable, and if not challenged within 30 
days, appeal of those errors is waived. 
Moreover, section 78-12-31.1 provides relief from the 
relatively short limitation period by specifically incorporating a 
tolling provision for justifiably unknown claims. 
Finally, the 90-day limitation period is reasonable given that 
inmates seeking habeas relief are provided free access to competent 
legal assistance by the incarcerating institution. Bounds v. Smith, 
430 U.S. 817 (1977); Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397 (10th 
Cir. 1987). Inmates do not face the delays or obstacles generally 
associated with locating, retaining and compensating an attorney 
for legal assistance. This enables the inmate to promptly identify 
potential habeas claims and seek redress in the courts. 
Under the facts of this case, the 90-day limitation period 
contained in section 78-12-31.1 is reasonable. In his petition, 
petitioner claimed that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea proceedings and at sentencing. Any alleged 
errors providing a basis for a habeas petition were readily 
ascertainable within 90 days of petitioner's sentencing. 
Therefore, the 90-day period is a reasonable procedural limitation 
with respect to petitioner's case. 
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II. THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION PURSUANT 
TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONTAINED 
IN SECTION 78-12-31.1. 
Petitioner was convicted on October 3, 1988 and was sentenced 
on April 3, 1989. However, petitioner did not file his habeas 
petition until April 16, 1992, over thirty-six months after his 
sentencing. Petitioner's petition was approximately thirty-three 
months late. At the latest, he should have known of his claims 
regarding counsel's effectiveness during the plea and sentencing 
proceedings within three months after he was sentenced. 
Even petitioner's claim that Raymond Marquez recanted his 
incriminating testimony is untimely. Marquez's affidavit was 
notarized on October 28, 1991. Thus, petitioner should have raised 
this claim no later than January 28, 1992. The foregoing 
demonstrates that the district court properly dismissed 
petitioner's petition as time-barred pursuant to section 78-12-
31.1. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 78-12-31.1 is a permissible procedural limitation 
under the Utah Constitution. It does not suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus, but merely limits the time-period in which a 
petition may be filed. Section 78-12-31.1 also does not violate 
Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution since it is not a 
rule of procedure. 
The 90-day limitation allows for excusable delay by barring 
only those claims which should have been discovered through the 
14 
exercise of reasonable diligence. Furthermore, the statute is 
reasonable as applied to petitioner's case. Petitioner should have 
been aware of the grounds for his petition within 90 days of his 
sentencing. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the 
petition as time-barred pursuant to section 78-12-31.1. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the dismissal 
of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / day of December, 1992. 
7?/ vsus 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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A D D E N D A 
A D D E N D U M A 
E N A T E C H A M B E R 
S T A T E O F U T A H 
• A L T LAKE CITY 
CERTIFICATION OF LEGISLATIVE TRANSCRIPT 
I hereby certify that the attached document consisting of 
six (6) signed pages is a true and authentic copy of the Utah State 
Senate floor debate of Senate Bill No. 245, 1979 General 
Legislative Session, Disk No. 296, dated March 3, 1979. 
Name 7 T i t l e V ~ f T ' ' Date 
TRANSCRIPTS OF SENATE nig^Tli QN SENATE BILL HO. 245 
MARCH 3 . 1979 
DOCKET CLERK: Senate Bill No. 245 Habeas Corpus Time 
Limitations. There is a report, Mr. President. Tour committee on 
Judiciary, to which was referred Senate Bill No. 245, Habeas Corpus 
Time Limitations, by Senator Barlow, has carefully considered the 
bill and reports the same out favorably, with the recommendation 
that the original bill be deleted in body and title and Substitute 
Senate Bill No. 245 be inserted in lieu thereof. Respectfully, 
Senator Asay, Committee Chairman. 
SENATOR ASAY: Mr. President. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senator Asay. 
SENATOR ASAY: I move the option of the committee report. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: All in favor of motion say I? (VOTE TAKEN) 
Oppose? (VOTE TAKEN) Motion carried. Senate bill 245 is before 
us. 
SENATOR BARLOW: Mr. President 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senator. 
SENATOR BARLOW: Mr. President, the purpose of this bill, 
Senate bill 245, does two things. One denotes the first part where 
it says within three months, within 90 days. What it simply means 
is that it eliminates a device that is often utilized by defense 
counsel in post-conviction remedies, in order to use a series of 
habeas corpus actions, both there in the State and in the Federal 
Courts, to delay the eventual carrying out of the sentence of the 
Court. Now we are talking about once the conviction is made, then 
the device now is to show that for some reason the trial was ah not 
TRANSCRIPTS OF SENA^ 1* nCTATK QH SENATE BILL NO. 245 
MARCH 3, 1979 
DOCKET CLERK: Senate Bill No. 245 Habeas Corpus Time 
Limitations. There is a report, Mr. President. Tour committee on 
Judiciary, to which was referred Senate Bill No. 245, Habeas Corpus 
Time Limitations, by Senator Barlow, has carefully considered the 
bill and reports the same out favorably, with the recommendation 
that the original bill be deleted in body and title and Substitute 
Senate Bill No. 245 be inserted in lieu thereof. Respectfully, 
Senator Asay, Committee Chairman. 
SENATOR ASAY: Mr. President. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senator Asay. 
SENATOR ASAY: I move the option of the committee report. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: All in favor of motion say I? (VOTE TAKEN) 
Oppose? (VOTE TAKEN) Motion carried. Senate bill 245 is before 
us. 
SENATOR BARLOW: Mr. President 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senator. 
SENATOR BARLOW: Mr. President, the purpose of this bill, 
Senate bill 245, does two things. One denotes the first part where 
it says within three months, within 90 days. What it simply means 
is that it eliminates a device that is often utilized by defense 
counsel in post-conviction remedies, in order to use a series of 
habeas corpus actions, both there in the State and in the Federal 
Courts, to delay the eventual carrying out of the sentence of the 
Court. Now we are talking about once the conviction is made, then 
the device now is to show that for some reason the trial was ah not 
ah handled properly. Now this change is required of both parties 
who represent the defendant and who seek to use a habeas corpus, 
would be required in order to successfully use that legal post-
conviction remedy, would only do so on grounds known to them, but 
would only do so that this was new information and that in ah that 
they should have known about it or should have been aware of it 
prior to this period because, two particular cases comes to my mind 
is the Hi-Fi case, in Ogden, and a motor cycle case up there in 
Carbon county. 
This is what often happens is that the defense attorney will 
know of grounds to postpone the carrying out of the conviction but 
they won't say anything about it until after the trial. And it is 
not a case where the person might be innocent or guilty. That has 
already been determined. Now this becomes a delaying tactic. And 
then they throw in something that they had already known and should 
have brought before the court, but they didn't bring it before the 
court because it is very obvious that the party was guilty. And 
so, they throw one thing at you, and then you wait about a year 
till it has gone through its various channels, now you are about 
ready to carry out the sentence, and then they throw another thing 
at you until this thing is delayed, not only a year but two years 
and three years. Now the question is, . . . what this will do is, 
that it simple means that within ninety days, if you have anything 
that you had already known about but didn't say anything about, a 
reasonable person would have known, then you can't use that as 
evidence• 
Now the next, now this is just on the habeas corpus. Now, I 
am not an attorney and any of these attorneys could probably cut me 
to pieces if they want to. 
Ms. Dunner, do we have a quorum? Mr. President? I don't want 
to talk to myself. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: You actually calling the Senate? 
SENATOR BARLOW: Well, if we vote on it, it doesn't make a 
difference but if its gonna to be • . . 
PRESIDENT FERRY: If there is not a quorum present a . . . 
SENATOR BARLOW: They ought to have . . . 
PRESIDENT FERRY: We'll ask the Sergeant at Arms to require 
the Senators to take their seats. Please. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senator Renstrom. 
SENATOR RENSTROM: Senator Barlow asked me if I would say a 
word on this bill, and I would like to. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Go ahead even though nobody is listening. 
SENATOR RENSTROM: I do considerable, . . . that's usually 
the case when I speak. I do a little bit of defense work, criminal 
defense work, not an awfully lot. But, I would write in support of 
this bill. 
I think sometimes the appeal process is abused, and as I 
understand this bill, and I am not terrible optimistic this is 
going to solve all our problems but certainly it's not going to 
solve all our appellate problems before Federal Courts. But 
certainly at the conclusion of a trial, if the lawyer feels that 
there is something wrong with the trail or that there is something 
wrong with the law, that all of those should be attacked in an 
immediate appeal and not use sequential attacks one after the 
other, and completing one attack, loosing, and then taking another 
attack, then loosing, but ultimately loosing only after years and 
years of expensive litigation. This bill I think would help to 
cure and put the responsibility on the lawyers and the defendants 
who are convicted to attack the trial, the law or what ever else 
that's loyal to them. 
Now Senator Barlow has built into this, I think an important 
safeguard, and that is that should there be newly found evidence or 
some other unusual circumstances, at the last minute, that would 
justify a higher court looking at it, of course that higher court 
could. So I rise in support of the bill. I think it is a good 
bill. It is not going to solve all the problems, that is certain, 
but I think it is a major step in the right direction. Thank you, 
Mr. President. 
PRESIDENT FERRYt Senator Asay. 
SENATOR ASAY: Mr. President, could I ask probably Senator 
Renstrom, who is a member of the bar, a question here? As I told 
you, I don't understand the legal jargon, but I understand plain 
English. So in just plain English, what do the words habeas corpus 
mean? 
SENATOR RENSTROMt Habeas corpus means to free the body. In 
other words, if you're in jail, I go down and get a writ of habeas 
corpus saying your body is unlawfully held, and a writ of habeas 
corpus would be to free your body from being unlawfully held. 
SENATOR ASAYs Free the body or produce the body. 
SENATOR RENSTROMi Produce the body. 
SENATOR ASAY; Get you out of jail? (laughter) 
£*** LJ,~/£ 
SENATOR RENSTROM: Get you out of jail. Right. 
SENATOR ASAY: If it means produce the body then instead of 
calling for a call of the Senate, we could just say habeas corpus, 
(laughter) Anyway, I want to speak in favor of this bill. A 
recent KSL editorial made the point that the Hi-Fi killers, for 
instance, that there has never been a question as to their quilt 
and the defendant had the due process of the law, but they've gone 
on an on. And the dollar figure now has exceeded a half a million 
dollars, and they're still going on and these so called 
technicalities where new evidences is being produced, and I think 
injustice is being done. So, I support this bill one hundred 
percent. 
SENATOR RENSTROM: Mr. President, may I please just make one 
parting in comment. Sometimes, and I feel too often, lawyers are 
disabused because they paint the law that is available to them and 
do all they possibly can on behalf of their clients. I remember 
hearing a very well known international lawyer say once, "The 
reason lawyers seem to be distrusted or disliked is simply because 
they represent people." Now I do not fault any lawyer for doing 
his job, even if it might appear at times to the public that he is 
abusing the process. If you were charged with the responsibility 
of representing an individual, you must realize how trauma ridden 
you feel sometime when the family is there, and you feel 
responsibility to the client as well as to the public. And I am 
pleased with the editorials that the newspapers have made in 
regards to some of these cases, where they seem to go on for ever, 
and they are saying, "Don't blame the lawyer, blame the system." 
/Z.- - . , , 
This bill, I think, will be a step in the right direction to help 
correct the system. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: If there's no more discussion? Answer, a 
question? 
SENATOR BARLOW: Mr. President, I was wondering if the body 
felt pretty good about this bill if we could maybe get a motion to 
get it to the House or of any single person or Senator would like 
to hold it up I would be glad to just move to third reading 
calendar. If there is no objection, then I would like to move that 
we consider it read for the second or third time and up for final 
passage. 
PRESIDENT FERR7: Senator Barlow moves that Senate Bill 244 
[245] under suspension of rules be read for the second and third 
time and up for final passage. All in favor, say I. Opposed. 
Motion carries, and we will call for role call vote. 
(Where as role call was taken as reported on page 1195 attached) 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senate Bill No. 245 final passage received 
26 Ayes, no Nays, and three absents. Having been approved, will be 
sent to the house for their consideration. 
**Voting recorded on page 1195 of the Senate Journal, dated 
Saturday, March 3, 1979 (attached). 
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TRANSCRIPTS OF HOUSE DEBATE ON SENATE BILL MO. 245 
MARCH 7. 1979 
LIMITATIONS - HABEAS CORPUS AND POST-CONVICTION AND REMEDIES 
MR. SPEAKER (HANSEN)i Senator Bangerter. 
REPRESENTATIVE BANGERTER: Mr. Speaker, I would move that we 
move 245 to the head of the third reading calendar. The 
representative that's here to handle that bill has an appointment 
with the court in about twenty minutes. It is such a short bill. 
I think we can handle that, and I would make that motion. 
MR. SPEAKER: You saying that may keep him here an hour. You 
heard the motion. All members in favor say, "I." (VOTE TAKEN) 
Those opposed say No. (VOTE TAKEN) Motion carried. Representative 
Rawson. 
REPRESENTATIVE RAWSON: I have a substitute motion. Mr. 
Speaker I was . . . 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative, I have already ruled on that 
motion. I am sorry. 
SENATOR RAWSON: What motion? 
MR. SPEAKER: The motion to move 245 to the head of the third 
reading calendar and consider it. The motion was placed. It was 
seconded. The vote was called for and passed. 
SENATOR RAWSON: Well, how about that, (laughter) 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative, would you read that in. Madame 
Reading Clerk has that been read in? 
READING CLERK: (inaudible). 
MR. SPEAKER: Would you read it in please? 
READING CLERK: Substitute Senate Bill No. 245, Limitations-
Habeas Corpus and Post-conviction and Remedies, by Senator Haven J. 
Barlow, being enacted by the legislature of the State of Utah. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Sykes. 
REPRESENTATIVE SYKES: Thank you very much Mr. Speaker. And I 
do appreciate your indulgence in this. Fellow Representatives, I 
got a little problem here. You've never faced the wrath of an 
angry Judge. Let me say, ah, just briefly about this bill. Many 
of you will recall the facts of a rather brutal and notorious 
murder that occurred in this state, in the city of Ogden, in April 
1974, where ah two individuals brutally raped a young girl, shot 
her to death, poured Draino down the throat of a young man, and he 
remains maned to this day, killed two other individuals, and ah 
shot shot [sic] one other and left him for dead. Ah, this was 
known as the Hi-Fi murder case. The trial on this matter occurred 
in the fall of 1974, about October. Trial lasted for five weeks. 
The defendants in this case has two, ah, three of the best criminal 
attorneys in the state of Utah. Ah, the appeal in this matter was 
decided in December 1977. Many of you have wondered, perhaps from 
time to time, why some of these notorious murder cases, why ah the 
defendants who have been sentenced to death, ah three, sometimes 
three and five years ago, remain unexecuted and justice remains 
unexecuted to this day. And the reason is a little ah thing of the 
law known as habeas corpus. 
Now habeas corpus is a constitutional challenge to any 
proceeding which leads to an individuals confinement. And the 
tactic of ah many criminal defense attorneys has been, long after 
the trial is over, long after the appeal is over, to file a habeas 
corpus petition, sometimes right before the execution is or has 
been scheduled. A good example of this was in the case of Gary 
Gilmore, where a habeas corpus petition was filed on ah at 7:00 
p.m. on Sunday night, when execution was scheduled for Monday 
morning. And this puts a tremendous burden on the State of Utah in 
responding to these matters. Ah. It ah is a almost impossible to 
do and often times, ah a almost always, the habeas corpus petition 
is based upon matters which were known or should have been known to 
the ah defendants and their attorneys, sometimes years before. But 
yet, they bring them up at the last minute. And the purpose of it 
is to simply to delay the execution of justice. 
Now, Substitute Senate Bill No. 245 is a bill that places a 
statute of limitation upon ah habeas corpus petitions for matters 
that they either knew or should have been known, and it's within 
three months of when the the [sic] defense either knew or should 
have known of the alleged defects in the trial. Ah. A second part 
of that says, ah, in subsection (2) there, that no post-conviction 
remedy, which would include others other than habeas corpus, may be 
applied for or entertained by the Court within the 30 days prior to 
the scheduled execution, on grounds that they knew or should have 
known prior to that date. So this will, this will, do away with 
what's been known as a charade in the run of the law. Just a 
charade and a mockery of justice in bringing these last minute 
appeals based upon frivolous grounds. I would be happy to answer 
any questions. Other than that, I'd urge your favorable support of 
the bill that's past 26 to zero in the Senate. I hope that's not 
the knell of death in this body. But, it's a very good bill, and 
it will help to put some sense into our judicial process in this 
state. 
MR. SPEAKER: Thank you. Mow to the bill. Representative 
Davis. 
REPRESENTATIVE DAVIS: Mr. Speaker, a number of years ago, the 
Supreme Court found the Capital punishment to be unconstitutional, 
and the following morning, I introduced the capital punishment bill 
here in the House at 10:00. Later that afternoon, about 1:00, as 
I recall, a police officer was shot to death on Salt Lake City 
streets. The first time in 20 some years, I guess. Later the 
Criminal Code revision incorporated all of that, and we do have the 
capital punishment bill in our statutes. 
I stand in support of Bob Sykes bill here today, and I hope 
that all of us will support this measure. 
MR. SPEAKER: Thank you. Representative Richards? I see no 
further life sign, do you want to sum up? 
REPRESENTATIVE SYKES: Thank you very much, I urge your 
favorable support of this bill. 
MR. SPEAKER: Voting is now opened on Senate Bill No. 245. 
Would you quickly vote. 
MR. SPEAKER: It appears to the chair that all present have 
voted on this bill. Voting will now be closed. Senate bill 245, 
having received 55 affirmative votes, and 5 negative votes has 
passed this house and shall be signed in open session. 
The foregoing, Senate bill 245, was publicly read by title and 
immediately thereafter signed by the speaker of the house, in the 
presents of the house, over which presides and the fact at this 
time we do enter upon the journal this 7th day of March 1979. 
A^A «T> «*oe 1513-14 of the House Journal, dated 
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not voting: Representatives: 
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Peterson, C. 
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H.C.R. No. 9 transmitted to the Senate for its action. 
MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS 
On motion of Representative Bangerter, the House voted to 
advance Substitute S.B. No. 245. UMITATIONS • HABEAS 
CORPUS AND POST-CONVICTION AND REMEDIES, to the 
head of the third reading calendar. 
CONSIDERATION OF SENATE BILL 
ON THIRD READING 
Substitute S.B. No. 245, LIMITATIONS-H ABE AS CORPUS 
AND POST-CONVICTION AND REMEDIES, read the third Ume 
and placed on its final passage. 
Substitute S.B. No. 245 then passed on the following roll call: 
Yeas, 55; Nays, 5; Absent or not voting, 16. 
Those voting in the affirmative were: Representatives: 
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Allred 
Arrington 
Atwood 
Bangerter 
Brown 
Cannon 
Christensen 
Christiansen 
Davis 
Dmitrich 
Doane 
Evans 
Farnsworth 
Florez 
Free 
Garff 
Garr 
Harmer 
Harrison 
Heslop 
Hollingshaus 
Humberstone 
Irvine 
Johnson 
Judd 
Knowlton 
Leavitt 
LeFevre 
McAllister 
McKeachnie 
McMullin 
Mecham 
Money 
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Pace 
Palmer 
Parkin 
Peterson, C. 
Peterson, G. 
Peterson, L. 
Redd 
Reese 
Richards 
Rowe 
Saunders 
Schmutz 
Selleneit 
Smith 
Starr 
Stephens 
Sykes 
Wahlstrom 
White, J. 
Wilcox 
Speaker Hansen 
Those voting in the negative were: Representatives: 
Bishop 
Harward 
Hoi brook 
Strong 
Whitesides 
Absent or not voting: Representatives: 
Brockbank 
Fox 
Gardner 
Hawkes 
Jones 
Jorgensen 
Livingston 
Nielsen 
Patterson 
Rawson 
Rogers 
Taylor 
Watt 
White, B. 
Wimmer 
Substitute S.B. No. 245 was signed by the Speaker in open 
session, in the presence of the House, and forwarded to the 
Senate for the signature of the President, enrolling and 
transmission to the Governor. 
MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS 
